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the deceiver should be a loser, than a stranger." And on page
135 Judge SELIE lays down the further rule, that where the
party dealing with an agent has ascertained that the act of the agent
corresponds in every particular, in regard to which such party has
or is pregumed to have any knowledge, with the terms of the power,
he may take the representation of the agent as to any extrinsic
fact which rests peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent, and
which cannot be ascertained by a comparison of the power with
the act done under it. This case is expressly affirmed in N. Y.
&fN. I. B. R. Co. v. Schuyler et al., 3& New York 30, where the
question of the liability of the principal is elaborately discussed,
and the special rules above stated are distinctly reaffirmed.
Elaborate as have been the discussions, both judicial and by the
text writers, of the questions relating to special agents, it is much
to be regretted that they have not been more definitely and authoritatively settled. But the general tendency seems to be in
favor of protecting innocent third parties who have acted upon the
confidence of an authority which in the ordinary course of business
they were justified in believing that the agent possessed, leaving
the principal to settle with the agent for any departure from the
JOSIAH H. BISSELL.
strict letter of his instructions.
Chicago.
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CHARLES EATON, BY uis GUARDIAN, RESPONDENT, v. THE DELAWARE,
LACKAWANNA & WESTERN RAILROAD, APPELLANTS.
Plaintiff being invited by the conductor got into the caboose of a coal train and
rode without paying any fare. An accident occurred through the negligence of
the conductor, whereby plaintiff was injured. Held, the relation of carrier and
passenger had not been created, and the company was bot liable.
Where a railroad company has dividcd its business between passenger and freight
trains, the conductor of the latter, though called by the same name, has not the
powers of a conductor in regard to passengers. Notice of his want of power will
be implied from the nature and apparent division of the business, and a person
claiming to be a passenger on such train has the burden of proof of circumstances
to except him from the general presnmption. Per DwxGHT,Commissioner.
PLAINTIFF, being then under twenty-one years of age, was with
two other boys, walking towards his home on the railroad track,
and having been passed by a coal train moving slowly was
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beckoned by the conductor in charge of it, who was then on
the rear car, a caboose, to get upon the train. The plaintiff
and his associates acted accordingly. The conductor afterwards
solicited them to go with him upon his return trip to a place called
Philipsburg, where he would procure for them situations as brakesmen. They went with him. The train towards morning stopped
on the track at a point where there was a sharp curve in the road.
The conductor was guilty of negligence in not sending back a
flagman to warn an approaching train. No signal was given nor
was any light exposed for this purpose. A collision occurred by
which the plaintiff sustained serious injury without negligence on
his part.
The rear car or caboose, in which the plaintiff was at the time
of the injury, was supplied with a stove, and there were boxes running up and down the car in which *thetools, &c., of the employees
of the road were kept. The car was also used as a place of deposit for lanterns, couplings, &c.
The boxes had covers on which persons could sit. The car was
in substance a store-room, and used for carrying provisions while
the train was on the road. These arrangements were made for
the convenience of the defendant's servants, and the car really carried train equipments. There was no evidence that passengers
either habitually or occasionally (except in the present instance)
rode in the caboose. There was a regulation of the defendant
printed on the tables intended for the use of its employees, that
passengers were forbidden to ride on coal trains. Disobedience
of this rule, if known to the defendant, was followed by a discharge of the employee so offending. Of this regulation the plaintiff had no actual notice, and it was not put up in the caboose.
The plaintiff paid no fare, nor was any demanded of him.
Hamilton Odell, for appellants.
Fred. A. Ward, for respondent.
DwIqGiT, Commissioner.-The real inquiry in the present action
is, whether, under the circumstances of the case, the relation of
common carrier and passenger existed between the plaintiff and
defendant. If that can be established it is plain that the negligence of the conductor was such as to make the defendant liable for
the plaintiff's injuries. It must, however, appear that the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff to exercise care towards him.
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That duty can only spring up from acts of the conductor causing
the relation of common carrier and passenger to exist between the
parties. It is now well settled that liability in such cases is to be
derived from a pre-existing duty or obligation on the part of the
principal. In that case the negligence of the servant whom he
employs to discharge the duty or obligation is imputable to himself
so as to render him responsible: Smith v. Dock, L. R. 3 0. P..
326 ; Collis v. Selden, Id. 395; Nicholson v. Brie lailway Co., 41
N. Y. 525, and cases cited in opinion of EARL, C. J.
The solution of the question at issue is not to be sought in the
rules of law appertaining to common carriers. It must be obtained
from the principles of the law of agency. The true inquiry is
whether the conductor, as an agent of the defendant, had the power
to take the plaintiff upon the train in such a way as to bind the
defendant as a carrier to him as a passenger.
The question submitted to the jury at the trial was whether
the plaintiff was informed of the regulation referred to, and they
were instructed that if they should answer that in the negative,
the plaintiff could recover. To this direction, exception was taken
by the defendant.
In considering the effect of the facts, it should be premised
that railroad companies, like other common carriers, have aright to
make reasonable regulations as to the management of their business.
While they may, if they see fit, have the freight and passenger
carried on upon a single train under one management, they may
also completely separate their transactions by arranging them in
distinct departments. They may thus have an engineer, brakesman and conductor, whose duties shall be confined solely to the
management of a freight train. Such a conductor, though bearing the same name as the general manager of a passenger train,
would have quite different powers. The law would, in general,
only confer upon him such authority as was incidental to the
business of moving freight, and no power whatever as to the transportation of passengers. This would clearly be the case if a
person applying to be a passenger on a freight train had actual'
notice of the division of the business. In the great transactions
of commercial corporations, convenience requires a subdivision of
their operations among many different agents. Each of these may
have a distinct employment, and become a general agent in his particular department, with no powers beyond it. Ile is only iden-
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tified with the principal to that extent. Notice to such an agent
would only be notice to the principal in respect to the department
in which he acted: 1 Parsons on Contracts 76, 5th ed. See
Story on Agency, sect. 167, sect. 17, where the distinction
between a strict general agent and one for a particular purpose is
considered. Sect. 131, as to his powers. Also 1 Pars. on Cont. 76.
These general propositions will scarcely be disputed. The remaining inquiry is whether notice to a supposed passenger will
not be implied from the nature and apparent division of the
business. It would seem so. The matter will be simplified by
supposing in the outset of the discussion that this bad been a coal
train without any caboose attached. Under such circumstances,
although a wayfarer had taken a gratuitous ride with the conductor's
assent upon one of the coal-vans happening for the moment to be
empty, so that be could improvise a seat, he could scarcely be
deemed a passenger, and the defendant as to him a carrier. The
presumption is that a person on a freight train is not legally a
passenger, and it lies with him who claims to be one to take the
burden of proof to show that under the special circumstances of
the case the presumption has been rebutted. So if a stage-coach
proprietor should regularly carry his passengers in a stage and
their baggage in a wagon, there would be a fair presumption that
the wagon was not intended for passengers, though under special
circumstances it might be used in that manner. A person asserting that he was a passenger, though riding in the baggagewagon, would be bound to prove it. In both these cases, the distinction between the passenger and the freight business would be
so marked by the external signs of classification that any person
of ordinary prudence would take notice of it. This would be
equivalent to actual notice, and the burden of proof would devolve
upon him to show that the carrier had relaxed his rule: Robertson v. New York and -ErieRailway, 22 Barb. 91.
The question now recurs, whether there is anything in the facts
of the present case to rebut the presumption which would naturally be derived from the separation of the defendants' coal business
from its other transactions. If so, it must be in the authority of
the conductor as a general agent of the defendant, or in the appearance of the caboose as fitted up for the transportation of passengers, or in the conductor's invitation or suggestion as to the
plaintiff's employment as a brakesman.
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It is a fallacy to argue that a conductor is a general agent for
this purpose, assuming that his power would, as a rule, place him
under the class of general, agents. Ile only holds that position
for management of afreiglht train. The fact that the same 'word,
conductor, is used to designate servants in two kinds of business,
which the defendant has made perfectly distinct, tends to confusion. There is no real analogy between the duties of a conductor
of a passenger train and those of the manager of a strict freight
train. A different class of men would naturally be employed in
the two cases. The defendant has a right to assign specific duties
to the one distinct from those performed by the other. It is a
familiar rule in such a case that an agent cannot increase his powers
by his own acts. They must always be included in the acts or
conduct of the principal: Marvin v. Wilber, 52 N. Y. 270, 273.
No acts of a conductor of a freight train will bind the company
as to carrying passengers, unless the principal in some way assents
to it. In the present case, it was distinctly proved that the company forbade the act, and there was no evidence of any form of
assent to its exercise except that which may be inferred from the
use of the caboose.
The caboose was not fitted up in the manner usual in passengers'
cars. Its general appearance showed it to be exclusively designed
for the use of the defendant's servants. The plaintiff could
not have been misled, as he paid no fare. The conclusion is that
there was nothing in the attendant circumstances in the present
instance to show that the conductor could, by inviting the plaintiff
to get upon the train, create between him and the defendant the
relation of passenger and carrier.
The result is supported by the adjudged cases. In Lygo v.
Newbold, 9 Exch. 802, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant
to carry certain goods for her in his cart. The defendant sent
his servant, who without the defendant's authority permitted the
plaintiff to ride in the cart. On the way the cart broke and the
plaintiff was injured. It was held that the defendant had not contracted with the plaintiff to carry her, and that he was not liable.
The Supreme Court of Maine have sought to weaken the force of
this case by the assertion that it was not the case of a common
carrier: Dunn v. Grand Trunk Bailway Co., 10 Am. L. Reg. N.S. 623. The criticism seems to be unfounded, as the question
here at issue does not respect the duties of a common carrier to a
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passenger, but is the preliminary one whether the plaintiff is a passenger. This depends upon the law of agency, and to this the decision in Lygo v. Newbold is strictly applicable. Elkins v. B.
211
I.
B. B. Co., 23 N. H. 275, is favorable to the defendant. The railway company in that case had a regulation prohibiting the carriage
of freights on passenger trains. It was held that as it had riot
authorized nor acquiesced in any deviation from the regulation,
and had received no compensation for the carriage of the goods,
it was not liable. Reference may also be made to the authorities
establishing the proposition that whenever an agent has powers
over a definite subject, he cannot by his own act extend his powers
to other subjects, even of a cognate character. Notice to the person dealing with him is immaterial: Benedict v. Martin, 36 Barb.
288; Gilbert v. Beach, 5 Bosw. 445; 8 N. Y. 222; 11 Id. 432.
The case of Lawrenceburgh and Miss. B. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 7 Ind. 476, is not opposed to these views. The only
point bearing ori the present subject was whether the court below
erred in not instructing thejury that a railroad company is not
liable for an injury which may happen to a person who takes passage on a train engaged in transporting gravel and not engaged
in carrying passengers. The court properly held that the request
for this instruction was too broad. It added: "In the case of
Fitzpatrick v. New Albany and Salem B. B., Id. 436, we decided
that a person riding upon a- gravel train might, under certain circumstances, recover for an injury occasioned by a collision.
Besides, the last qualification of the proposed instruction was calculated to mislead the jury, as it appeared that the company had
carried passengers in gravel trains in a number of instances : p.
447." This decision, owing to the special grounds upon which it
was placed, has no bearing on the present case: the facts being
materially different.
The case of Dunn v. The Grand Trunk Railway Co., supra,
in its precise facts is not opposed to the theory adopted in the case
at bar. -The plaintiff had paid his fare and entered the saloon-car
of a freight train, contrary to the regulations of the company, but
with knowledge of the conductor. The company was held liable.
The case differs from the one at bar in two respects ; payment of fare
.and the attachment of a saloon-car. What that was is not
precisely stated. It may be assumed to be one fitted up for the accommodation of passengers. It might thus perhaps be inferred
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that the defendant had assented to a relaxation of its rules. The
reasoning of the case is disapproved by a well known text-writer
upon railways, Judge REDFIELD, in his note in the Law Register,
and is unsatisfactory. The principle there acted upon is not to be
extended beyond the precise facts of the case.
The only other point to be considered is whether the suggestion
of the conductor that the plaintiff might secure employment as a
brakesman, if lie would go with him to Philipsburg, is of such a
character as to impose a liability upon the defendant. The same
general course of reasoning already resorted to is applicable. The
employment of brakesmen is no part of the ordinary duty of a conductor. The company gave him no power to make any arrangement of the kind. Even if his suggestion had been influential in
former cases, the plaintiff had not acted upon that fact. The defendant had not held him out as having authority; the testimony on
this branch of the case most favorable to the plaintiff is that the
conductor told the plaintiff that if lie wanted work and would go
back to Philipsburg, he was sure of a situation, or that he would
get him a situation, and promised that he should be a brakesman
on the road. It appeared, however, that the conductor had no
authority to employ brakesmen, this part of the business being
intrusted to an employee termed a "train-despatcher."
Looking
at this testimony in the most favorable light, it is only an instance
of an agent having defined authority making representations beyond
the scope of his agency. It is not one of those cases where he has
an apparent authority including the act in question, but, owing to
a secret fact, does not have it in the particular case: _North River
Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill 262; Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v.
Butchers' and Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, 128; Whitbeck v.
Schuyler, 44 Barb. 469; N. . and N. H. R. R. v. Schuyler, 34
N. Y. 30 ; Bawles v. Desier, 3 Keyes 572.
On the other hand there is nothing in the business of a conductor
which could lead to the conclusion that lie had authority to make
contracts with persons to act as brakesmen. His apparent duties
are to carry forward a train after it is organized. The business
of organizing it is in its nature wholly distinct. It is in fact committed to a "train-despatcher."
Under such circumstances, there is no act on the part of the defendant by which he can be estopped from showing the conductor's
real authority, any more than a commercial house would be if one
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of its travellers, in the course of a journey, assumed to hire a clerk
to do bussinse for his employers at home. Suppose that such a
person, while driving his employer's carriage, in the course of his
business, had taken up a person casually met on the highway in
whom he became interested, and to whom he had promised employment as a clerk, with the intention of carrying him to such employer;
would the employer be liable for the negligent driving of the
traveller, whereby the promissee was injured ? The contention of
the plaintiff must go the length of maintaining that the company
was bound by the act of the conductor to take the plaintiff into its
service. If he had reached his destination without injury and
received no employment he would on the principle asserted in this
case have an action against the defendant for not supplying him
with work.
The conductor's authority to carry can only be incidental to his
power to make a valid engagement for the plaintiff's services. The
admission of such a doctrine would subvert familiar rules of the
law of agency. It cannot be that it is law: Cochran v. Newton,

5 Den. 487; Stringham v. St. Nicholas Ins. Co., 8 Keyes 280.
But it is said that by the act of the conductor, the plaintiff was
lawfully on the train, and that for this reason, the defendant was
liable to him for the*negligence of its servants. With due submission, this is simply begging the question. The plaintiff could
only be "1lawfully " on the- train by an authorized act of the conductor. The question still recurs, had the conductor the authority
to take the plaintiff on the train. If not, he could not lawfully
be there. It is not necessary to consider whether he was a trespasser.
It is enough to hold that a duty to be careful towards him could
only spring up on the part of the defendant, by an act on the
conductor's part coming within the scope of his authority.
It has already been abundantly shown that there was no such
act. The judgment should be reversed.
DWIGHT,

concur.
C., not
Judgment reversed and new trial granted.

C., reads for reversal.

LOTT

EARL, C.; reads for affirmance and dissents.

voting.

We have read the foregoing opinion
with great satisfaction, and we doubt
not such will be the general sentiment
of the profession. There is often no

and

GRAY,

REYNOLDS,

small difficulty in determining precisely
how far the manager of a freight train
has authority to carry passengers and
bind the company to full responsibility,
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as passenger carriers; and if not, what
responsibility, if any, is assumed by the
company, when the manager of a freight
train allows persons to ride on the train,
when he accepts fare, and when he does
not. There is this difference between
cnaes, whcrd fare is paid and where it is
not : that, in the formL-r case, the person

claiming to be a passenger may, very
naturally, be misled by having paid fare,
into the belief that it is done with the
concurrence of the company, or, what is
the same thing, of the general superintendent ; while, on the other hand, if no
fare is paid by such person lie is virtually
notified that such is not the fact, or at
all events put upon inquiry in regard to
it, which is the same thing in the law.
If one is allowed by what is called, not
in any precise language, the conductor
of any train not a passenger train,
whether freiht, gravel or construction
train, to ride without payment of fare,
he is bound to know, from the very
nature of the transaction, that it is notby
consent of tile company, since he cannot
suppose, with any plausibility, that the
company make a common business of
carrying persons upon all or any of their
trains, not passenger trains, without pay.
And unless it is the authorized business
of the train to carry passengers in emergencies, the conductor can have no
.general authority to carry them at all.
And if he had any special authority, in
the particular case, or from his general
authority as to partictlar emergencies,
it must be specially proved by the person
claiming its existence. Aside from this
distinction between paying and not paying fare, we are not aware, that there
is any legal difference, whether it is done
or not, as to binding the company, unless
it were shown that the money came to
the use of the company with its knowledge and consent, which could only
come through some agent, having authority to bind the company in such a
matter, who must, it would seem, be the
general superintendent.
VOL. XXI.-44

There may be other facts, in similar
cases, such as the fact of having carried
passengers in repeated instances in the
same mode, and possibly the fitting up of
the caboose car might sufficiently indicate,
that it was intended for general passengers: but ordinarily, we should not regard
the fact, that some place existed upon a
freight train where persons could sit, as
any indication that it was intended for
general passengers, unless it exceeded
what the company would be likely to do
for the accommodation of their employees
merely. But this, and also the other
question, of having carried passengers in
the same manner, are purely questionsof fact, to be determined by the jury, as
tending to show the acquiescence of the
company.
The fact that the person carried was
ignorant of the regulation of the company, prohibiting passengers being carried upon other than passenger trains,
does not seem to us to possess any forcewhatever. Every one is bound to take.
notice how business is transacted by railway companies, and to know that ordi-.
narily passengers are carried in passenger
carriages, whether exclusively forming
passenger trains, or attached to freighttrains, or mixed trains. And lie is also.
bound to know, that if passengers arecarried on other trains, it is by special
dispensation, as an exceptional matter,.
ani he must see to it, that he is able to.
show such dispensation anil that his case.
comes within it, and to know that the
conductor of a freight train has no generalagency, extending to the carrying of passengers, in tiny mode, and that he has no.
excuse for depending upon his agency in
any such matter, unless he knows and is.
able to prove that it has been specially
conferred, over and above his general anthority, resulting from his employment.
It will be seen from whatowe have beforesaid, that this case possesse no feature of.
doubt. It seems to us just-as free from,
doubt, as if the general superintendenthad been present and informed the
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plaintiff, that the conductor of that train
had no authority to carry passengers,
in any emergency. This being a coal
train, makes it, if possible, clearer from
all doubt, than if it had been an ordinary
freight train, since the general freight,
or the fast freight, as it is called, has often
a passenger car attached, but coal trains
never.
The point made, that the conductor
gave the plaintiff assurance of employment, as a brakeman, by the company,

and the plaintiff was going to test the
assurance, seems to us even less favorable
to plaintiff, than the other construction.
There is not a scintilla of evidence, that
the conductor had any such authority,
or that he even claimed to have. He
seems to have been acting wholly as a
volunteer, so far as the company was
concerned, and acting, not only legally,
but ostensibly on behalf of the plaintiff.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
COLUMBIA FIRE INSURANCE CO. v. DAVID P. KINYON.
A contract of insurance made in another state on property situated in New Jersey is valid and will be enforced here.
Although it would be competent by legislation to invalidate in our courts an
insurance contract made in good faith in another state on property located here,
it would be so contrary to the comity which has been observed between the states,
that such an intention will not be imputed to the law-makers, unless the language
used so clearly expresses that purpose as to bear no other reasonable interpreta.
tion.
The regulations of our insurance laws are not merely for the purpose of revenue,
they impair the contract made in violation of them, so far at least as concerns the
right of the foreign corporation.to sue upon it. Whether public policy requires
that the party insured shall be permitted to enforce the agreement is not decided.
The declaration is defective in that it does not show that when the assessment
was made upon the deposit note the defendant was a member of the company and
as such liable to assessment, nor does it show that the losses assessed accrued
-while the defendant's policy was alive, or that the assessment was made on the
basis authorized by the corporation act.
If the policy had expired, the defendant could not be held without alleging that
the loss accrued before its expiration. If the policy was alive the losses must have
occurred while it wa in force.

THis was an action on the case by the Columbia Fire Insurance
Company, a foreign incorporation chartered by the state of Pennsylvania,.to recover the amount of certain alleged assessments made
on" the deposit or premium-note given by the defendant for his
policy.
The other facts appear in the opinion.

J.

a. Shipman, for plaintiff.

Bird, for defendant.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
VAN SYCKEL, J.-The principal question is as to the force of
our Acts of 1860 and 1867 concerning insurance companies.
The fourth plea avers that the policy of insurance and the premium-notes were made and delivered at Raritan in this state, contrary to the act of our legislature entitled "An Act to regulate the
business of fire insurance companies or associations not incorporated by this state," approved March 19th 1860, and also to the
act entitled "An Act to regulate the business of fire, life, accident,
marine and live-stock insurance by companies or associations not
incorporated by this state," approved April 19th 1867.
To this plea the plaintiff replied that they did not make and execute the policy, and take the premium-note at Raritan in this state,
but that the same were made, executed and delivered at Columbia
in the state of Pennsylvania, and thereupon the defendant demurred to this replication.
The demurrer admitting all the facts well pleaded in the replication, raises the question, whether this contract of insurance made
in Pennsylvania can be enforced here?
It is the evident purpose of the Acts of 1860 and 1867 to put.
under certain regulations the doing of business in this state by foreign insurance companies. This object is accomplished by prescribing the conditions upon which they may effect insurance
through agencies established here. No intention is manifested of
an attempt to restrain or control the business of these corporations,
so far as it is transacted outside the limits of this state, or to give
our legislation any extra-territorial effect.
Comity requires us to enforce a contract made in another state,
and valid there unless it is clearly prohibited by some provision of
these enactments.
The defendant insists that this restraint is found in the first section of the Act of 1860, which provides, "That it shall not be
lawful for any company chartered by another state, to transact
any business connected with insuring property situated in this
state, &c." Even if this section is not superseded by the Act of
1867, it must, in connection with the subsequent provisions, be
construed to inhibit any foreign company from transacting any
business connected with insuring property situated in this state,
through,.gencies established here, without conforming to the requirements of our laws. That this is the fair construction of the
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act is manifest from its second section, which authorizes the Secretary of State after theforeign company has complied with its terms,
to issue a certificate of authority, not to enable the company to
make a contract out of this state to insure property here located,
but to allow an agency to be established in the county where applied
for to transact business in this state.
It is also to be observed that the penalties denounced by the
act are aimed only at the unauthorized agent acting within this
state.
Corporations are artificial beings, the creatures of positive law,
and not citizens within the meaning of that clause of the Federal
Constitution, which secures to the citizens of each state "like
privileges and immunities with the citizens of the several states."
It may therefore be conceded, not only that our legislature may
put under restraint business transacted in this state by a company
created by the law of another state, but in the exercise of their
plenary power may limit if they cannot deny the right of such
company to sue in our courts. Although it would be competent
by legislation to invalidate in our courts an insurance contract
made in good faith in another state on property located here, it
would be so contrary to the comity which has been observed
between the states, that such an intention will not be imputed to
the law-maker, unless the language used so clearly expresses that
purpose as to bear no other reasonable interpretation. There is
nothing in our laws except the clause above cited to countenance
in the slightest degree such a disposition on the part of our legislature, and the language there used will not only bear another
construction, but it was omitted from the later Act of 1867, which
repeals all inconsistent legislation.
It is argued that, under the rule now adopted, agencies established here may evade our laws by the simple device of concluding
their contracts out of the state. If our laws were otherwise so
impotent as to permit such palpable evasion to pass unpunished,
it would be clearly within the reach of the first section of the Act
of 1860..
The following cases support the rule that where the policy is
issued and the insurance effected in the foreign state, on property
situated in another state whose laws render it void if made there,
the contract is valid and enforceable by either party: Hyde v.
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Goodnow, 3 Comst. 267; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; Huntly
v. ferrill, 32 Barb. 627; Williams v. Cheney, 3 Gray 215.
Hfyde v. Goodnow was a suit in New York upon a deposit-note
given for an insurance effected in New York on property situated
in Ohio. The Ohio statute declared void every policy signed,
issued or delivered in that state or on any property of any kind
situate in that state, by any foreign company, except through a
duly licensed agent. The Court of Appeals held that the contract
was not made in Ohio, and therefore was not within the prohibition
of this statute.
It is not to be presumed that the court overlooked the words
"or on any property of any kind situate in that state," contained
in the Ohio statute.
In the later case of The People v. Imlay the defendant set up
that the contract was in contravention of the statute of New York
concerning foreign insurance companies, but the defence failed on
the ground that-the contract was made in Pennsylvania, and being
valid there, would be enforced in New York.
There is nothing in our statute which will make this case an exception to the general rule that the law of the place where a contract is made or to be performed is to govern as to the nature,
validity, construction and effect of such contract; being valid in
such place, it is to be considered equally valid everywhere. It
will be enforced here not proprio vigore, but ex comitate.
My conclusion is that a contract of insurance made out of this
state on property here situate, is valid.
The regulations of our insurance laws are not merely for the
purpose of revenue, leaving unimpaired the contract made in violation of them.
The Act of April 15th 1846 imposes a tax upon foreign companies which, establish agencies in this state, the principal object
of which, as stated in the preamble, was to deprive them of the advantage they would otherwise have over our home corporations.
The subsequent Acts of 1860 and 1867 manifest very clearly the
more important purpose of protecting the public against imposition
which might otherwise be practised by wholly irresponsible companies, by requiring that the foreign company shall exhibit under
oath, and file with our secretary of state, a statement showing that
they are possessed of a sound, well invested capital of at least 'one
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hundred and fifty thousand dollars over and above all claims and
liabilities, before authority can be had to appoint agents.
The raising of revenue by the imposition of a tax is merely incidental. The agent therefore who acts without due authority is not
only liable to the penalty in such case prescribed, but the contract
made in contravention of the law is itself void so far as concerns
the right of the foreign principal to sue upon it: Washington County
Ins. (o. v. Dawes, 6 Gray 376; Williams v. Cheney, 8 Gray
206.
In such cases it may be required by public policy, that the party
insured shall be permitted to enforce the agreement, but no opinion
is expressed on this point.
The objection, that in the replication there is a departure in
pleading, is not well taken. The place laid in the declaration was
merely formal.
The demurrer to the replication reaches back in its effect through
the whole record, and attaches ultimately to the first substantial
defect in the pleading. Under this rule the sufficiency of the
declaration has been made the subject-matter of discussion.
1. The declaration alleges that the members of the corporation
are to be assessed on the premium-notes to pay the losses. It
recites that the defendant became a member in March 1867, and
became insured for a large amount, without specifying the sum for
which he was insured, or the time the policy was to run.
There is nothing in the pleading to show that when the assessment was made, the defendant was a member of the corporation
and as such liable to assessment.
2. It is further averred that every member is bound to pay losses
and necessary expenses in proportion to the amount of his depositnote. The amount of losses and expenses for which the deposit
notes were assessed is not stated, in fact it is not directly set forth
that any losses were incurred, nor is the aggregate amount of
the deposit-notes shown. There is no sufficient allegation by
which it can be determined whether the sum demanded by the
plaintiff is. according to the'terms of the contract. The action
being ex contractu for a specific, liquidated sum, there must be
such a statement of facts as will show a right to recover the amount
claimed.
The allegation is that the company in January 1870 made an
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assessment of seven and a half per cent. on the original amount
of all premium-notes held by the company and in force on the
27th day of November 1869, and by such assessment assessed upon
the premium-note of the defendant the sum of seventy-five dollars
for the purpose of paying losses incurred by the company by damage by fire. The assessment was laid to pay losses, but the
pleader has wholly failed to state whether the sum assessed was
less, greater or precisely equal to the amount of losses, or whether
they were such losses as accrued while defendant was a member of
the company, and for which he would be liable. The legal right
to assess the defendant must be clear on the face of the declaration.
If the policy had expired, the defendant could not be held without
alleging that the loss accrued before its expiration. If the policy
was alive, the losses must have occurred while it was in force:
Long Pond Ins. Company v. Houghton, 6 Gray 77; Savage v.
Medbury, 19 N. Y. 34.
It does not therefore appear that the assessment was laid upon
the basis authorized by the corporation act.
These are substantial infirmities in the declaration, and therefore
there must be judgment for the defendant.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
THOMAS W. HAMILTON v. THE PEOPLE.
An examination before a magistrate on a criminal charge is not invalidated by
a continuance to the 22d of February, and after taking testimony on that day
being continued to the 23d, although by law the 22d was dies non juridicus, and
assimilated to Sunday.
Where counts in a criminal information are misjoined, the court is not bound
to quash the information on motion, if the counts relate to one transaction, and
the court can regulate the evidence by confining it to that transaction and preventing the surprise or confusion of the defendant.
While evidence is admissible to show motive in the accused, vet where the crime
charged was the burning of a barn belonging to himself, in order to get tlhe insurance, the record of a suit in equity against him to recover the barn, &c., where
he had filed an answer denying the complainant's equity? &c., was too remote to
be admissible for the purpose of showing motive.
Where evidence is circumstantial, a wide latitude should be allowed to defendant in cross-examination to show the whole bearing of the facts alleged.
Where a co-defendant in a criminal case turns state's evidence and has tried to
convict others by proof also convicting himself, he will be held to have waived all
privilege of refusing to answer as to any facts bearing on the issue. And this
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waiier extends to all communications made to his counsel, so as to make both
himself and his counsel compellable to disclose such communications.
Where a party asking a question gets an answer that is not responsive, but which
would have been admissible in answer to a question calling for it, the other party
has no right to object to it and have it stricken out of the testimony.
Evidence to impeach a witness must be confined to his reputation for veracity,
but the attacking witness having shown his knowledge on that point may be asked
i; he would believe the other on oath.
The phrase, the jury in criminal cases are judges of the law as well as the facts,
is true so far as that the jury must render a general verdict on their consciences as
to the legal and actual guilt of the accused, and cannot be compelled to separate
the law and the facts. But the duty of the jury is the same in kind in criminal as
in civil cases, and the fact that an acquittal whether right or wrong is not reviewable, does not lessen the duty of the jury to obey the law as laid down by the
judge, without regard to their personal opinions as to what the law is or ought to be.
THE appellant was tried upon an information charging him with
setting fire to a barn for the purpose of obtaining money from an
insurance company. The information contained a number of counts,

some charging him jointly with William and Jam2es Hamilton and
William Fuller, some joining only Fuller, and others omitting one
or more of the other defendants in the alleged acts. Some of the
counts also charged the barn as the property of defendant, some as
the property of defendant and other persons jointly, and some as

the property of third persons only. Defendant was tried separately
and convicted upon circumstantial evidence and the testimony of
Fuller, one of the co-defendants, who was sworn as state's evidence.
Defendant sued out this writ of error. The other facts sufficiently

appear in the opinion.
Win. I. Brown, John
plaintiff in error.

. Patterson and ff. S .Brackett, for

Byron D. Ball, Attorney-General, for the people.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-Much of the record relates to various rulings

and proceedings upon pleadings in abatement, which preceded the
issue of not guilty.

The plea relied on was that the complaint

before the justice of the peace was brought on for examination on
the 21st df February 1872, and after it had been partly completed
was adjourned until the 22d, when some further testimony was
taken, and an adjournment had till the 23d, and thereafter proceedings went on to completion.

The objection is that the 22d of

February being not a law day the justice lost jurisdiction.
This cannotbe sustained. Thejustice, in these examinations, Pnes

HAMILTON v. THE PEOPLE.

not act judicially in the technical sense, but in his capacity of a
conservator of the peace, and the proceeding is one which at common law was conducted very much at discretion. We have found
no authority for holding that a criminal examination before a justice
is void, if a complaint has been made before him on oath, and the
accused are finally held to bail or committed on a law day upon
testimony taken in their presence in pursuance of it, so long as
there is no substantial break in the proceedings. No legal record
is required to be kept of them, and the continuance from day to
day is not such an adjournment as that the failure to announce it
would be of any consequence. The statute contemplates the proceedings as continuous unless formally adjourned from time to time,
and the close of business on one day would carry it over until the:
next business day as a matter of course, unless otherwise ordered.
The adjournment to the 22d, if illegal, would not interrupt the
legal course which would take the matter over to the 23d.
There was a preliminary examination upon a proper complaint
before a magistrate having jurisdiction, resulting in a commitment, and this was all that was necessary to justify proceedings by
information.
It was moved to quash the information, chiefly because of the
misjoinder of counts, the insufficiency of some of them, and the want
of preliminary examination on some of the charges. It was held in
Washburn v. People, 10 Mich. 372, that the fact of examination
need not be alleged in the information, but that the objection must
be made by motion to quash, or by plea in abatement. The
motion does not claim that there was no examination, but only
that it did not cover all the counts, and the counts so objected
to are not specified. The objection therefore is not tenable in
the form resorted to, as the motion to quash the whole information could not properly prevail on this ground. The question of
misjoinder is more serious. The complaint and the information
are both so confused and multifarious that the court below might
properly have declined to compel the defendants to go to a trial.
Offences are charged on which all the defendants could not possibly
be amenable. Some counts charge no offence at all. Others contain the charges upon which it is supposed that the trial was really
had, and to those there is no fatal objection, as the rules of criminal
pleading under our statutes justify the introduction of various
counts charging the ownership of property burned and the position
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of the respondents as principal or accessorial offenders, in different
ways : Anni8 v. People, 13 Mich. 511. It is intimated in King
v. Kingston, 8 East 41, that a demurrer would not lie to the whole
information for such a misjoinder, but that a proper remedy was
by motion to quash. Such a motion is addressed to the court's discretion (1 Bish. Cr. Pro., § 447), and ought to be granted where
the confusion is such as to be likely to interfere with the means
of defending, by misleading or perplexing the prisoner in meeting
the case or preparing for trial. But no wrong is done by refusing
it, where the court can prevent mischief; as it usually can, by confining the proof to the single transaction on which the defendant
was examined, or on which the prosecution has opened the testimony, or by compelling an election in the outset. But we do not
hold that such a motion is always discretionary under our statutes
requiring a motion to quash in lieu of a motion in arrest or to save
a ground of error. Where the various counts may all refer to the
same transaction, the safer course is usually not to quash, but to
regulate the proof on the trial as far as necessary to prevent the
surprise or misleading of the prisoner, and to confine it to that
transaction: Rez v. Young, R. & Ry. 280 (n.); Rex v. Ellis, 6
B. & 0. 145; Anonymous, 2 Leach C. C. 105. The propriety
of allowing proof of-the entire transaction was sustained in People
v. Mtarian, and Van Sickle v. People, at the January term. In
fine, there was no ruling below which can properly be reviewed,
which made it erroneous to put the respondents to their trial, although the misjoinder was gross and improper.
The theory of -the prosecution depended on Fuller's evidence,
he swearing to a plan, made in advance, to burn the barn in
question by putting a lighted candle in a place, where as it burned
low, it would reach litter and other combustible material and set
it on fire. The conviction was upon circumstantial evidence deriving its force chiefly from Fuller's explanation, without which no
conviction could have been justified.
The first ruling objected to related to the admission of certain
evidence-which the court afterward refused to strike out, showing
that in 1869 a bill was filed to rescind the conveyance of the land
on which the barn stood for fraud alleged to have been practised
by Thomas W. Hamilton and Nathaniel Badger. The object ofthe testimony was to establish a motive for the destruction of the
property by showing a dispute affecting title. Evidence of such
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an existing controversy might have some bearing on the question
of motive, though it may be difficult to guard it so as to preient
the jury from passing upon the facts of that controversy, which
could not lawfully be done. But as the files showed that the case
had been brought to an issue on bill, answer and replication, more
than a year before the fire, and that no proofs had been taken, and
as it was then too late to take proofs, and the answer denied the
equity of the bill, leaving the defendants vindicated as the case
stood, the introduction of the bill as evidence of motive was injurious and erroneous. Still more objectionable was the introduction
of foreclosure proceedings, begun after the fire, which could
furnish no proof of motive, for the condition of the title at the
time of the fire was open to proof more directly. No other legitimate inquiry could have been aided by proceedings ex po8t facto.
Evidence of the amount of hay in the barn was objected to, as
there was no valid count charging the burning of anything but the
barn, and the respondents had not been examined upon such a
charge. The fulness or emptiness of the barn might bear clearly
on the question of motive; there was no reason for excluding any
circumstance showing the extent of the fire and of the property
burned, and the jury was entitled to understand the whole transaction. The testimony in regard to playing cards in the barn
with lights should have been allowed to be fully given. Fire might
take from such a cause, and the defence were entitled to show all
circumstances reasonably bearing on such a possibility.
Testimony of a witness that in a conversation four or five months
after the fire, Hamilton, when asked whether he would keep the
farm, said, "He did not care, that he had got a good insurance on
the house, and it might go to blazes with the barn," was not proof
of any admission that the barn had been burned by him, and that
was the only point on which it can be claimed to have had relevancy.
Thomas W. Hamilton could not be charged with William Hamilton's false statement, the day after the fire, that the building was
not insured; it was not a part of the res gestae. It could not aid
in defrauding the insurance company, and must be regarded as an
independent assertion or act within the excluding rule in People v.
Knapp.

Henry Hamilton testified concerning what took place at a certain
party or dance at James Hamilton's, the night of the fire. Being
asked on cross-examination whether the dance was not talked of
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some time before it was got up, this was objected to. The defence
stated that they proposed to show that it was talked of and invitations given a week or ten days beforehand. The court ruled out
the question, and the defence excepted. Fuller says the plan was
that to prevent suspicion, a dance should be got up at another
person's house, and that during the evening one of the Hamiltons
should go out for cider, taking advantage of the opportunity to
light the candle, which would take some time to burn down to the
straw, so that they should be away at the party when the fire broke
out, and would escape suspicion. Now, if the party had been
arranged and invitations given earlier than the alleged interview
with Fuller, his whole story would be falsified; so this was a vital
point in the case, and the question asked was very clearly legitimate
cross-examination upon the strictest rules. The objection that it
would not contradict Fuller would not destroy its relevancy even
if true, and its truth would be a question of fact. - The court erred
in shutting out this proof.
When the witness Houseman had sworn to seeing the three
Hamiltons apparently consulting togetherafter the fire, the defence
should not have been precluded from cross-questioning him as to
the force of the impression made on him at the time, and as to where
he first mentioned it. " It is only by thorough sifting that it can
be known how much a witness has allowed his memory to be warped
by subsequent suspicions. The conclusiveness of circumstantial
evidence depends entirely on the assurance that facts have been
truly seen and sworn to.
It was error to refuse to allow the witness Ribble to be impeached
by testimony to contradict his denial, on cross-examination, of the
part he had taken in getting up testimony: Geary v. People,
22 Mich. 220. But the evidence of his statements in other cases,
or generally of his being open to bribery, do not come within any
recognised rule of impeachment unless they have made him a reputation for untruthfulness, and then it is only the reputation, and
not its cause, which is admissible. It was not error to allow a 'itness to be asked if be had deserted or had been charged with crime.
There was no attempt to impeach by contradiction on these collateral matters, and the answers were admissible. The impeachment
of Fuller by the witnesses Young and Jane -heethy should have
been received. He had been asked about his statements to them
concerning his testimony in this case, and had denied making such
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statements. The place and time were fixed with reasonable certainty, no objection for uncertainty being made when he was crossexamine(], and his answers having been positive and sweeping, his
statements that he had been offered a bribe, and would swear for
it, were material. The same remark applies to the impeachment
of Thomas Mulvany, where time and place were fixed accurately
and the fact was recent.
Several questions of an impeaching nature were excluded on the
ground that the witness Fuller had made disclosure of the facts to
his counsel, and they were therefore privileged. The rule of privilege was misconstrued. We are not disposed to narrow or hamper
privileged communications between clients and their attorneys or
counsel. We concur fully in the broad and sensible doctrine laid
down by Lord SELBORNE, in Minot v. Morgan, L. R. 8 Oh. Ap.
361, that neither client nor attorney can be compelled to answer
and disclose matters of confidence. But the privilege is one created
solely for the benefit of the client, and there is no ground for protection where he waives it: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 243; 1 Stark. Ev.
40; Benjamin v. Coventrj, 19 Wend. 353. When a co-defendant
in a criminal case turns state's evidence and has tried to convict
others by proof also convicting himself, he has no right to claim
any privilege concerning any of the facts bearing upon the issue.
He has waived all privileges which would permit him to withhold
anything: Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266. It was expressly
held in Alderman v. People, 4 Mich. 414, that this waiver
covered confidential communications to attorneys, and there is no
more reason for saving these, than for saving the privilege against
criminating himself. Each may be waived, and is by such criminating disclosures conclusively waived. Both client and counsel
may be compelled to disclose the client's statements which are pertinent to the issue.
The witness Gayton, having been sworn to sustain Fuller's reputation for truth and veracity, was asked whether he had not said
at a certain time and place that he would not believe Fuller under
oath, and answered that he did not think he had done so at that
time, but it was likely that he might have said so at the time of
Fuller's arrest for this crime. This answer was stricken out as
not responsive. He was then asked whether the arrest affected
his opinion of Fuller one way or the other. This was ruled out,
as well as a proposition to show his statements to different persons
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to the same effect, that he would not believe Fuller under oath.
If the answer was relevant, the objection that it was not responsive
did not concern the prosecution. The party examining a witness
may sometimes object to volunteered and irresponsive statements
made by a witness aside from his questions. But if he is willing
to accept the answer, and if it was one he would have a right to
elicit, the opposite party cannot complain. There are cases, as in
Greenman v. O'Conner, 25 Mich. 30, where the deposition of a
witness is taken on settled written interrogatories, when an answer
not called for may be objected to by either party for surprise, inasmuch as if the question had been so put in writing as to call for it,
other interrogatories might have been framed accordingly, which
might have led to explanation. But no such difficulty can arise
where the witness is examined openly and orally, and where a
question calling for such an answer would have been competent.
The purpose of any inquiry into the character of a witness is to
enable the jury to determine whether he is to be believed on oath.
Evidence of his reputation would be irrelevant for any other purpose, and a reputation which would not affect a witness so far as
to touch his credibility under oath, could have no proper influence.
The English text-books and authorities have always required the
testimony to be given directly on this issue. The questions put
to the impeaching and supporting witnesses relate (1) to their
knowledge of the reputation-for truth and veracity, of the assailed
witness, and (2) whether from that reputation they would believe
him under oath.
The only controversy has been whether the grounds of belief
must be confined to a knowledge of reputation for veracity only:
1 Starkie's Ev. 237 et seq.; 2 Phil. Ev. (Edwards's Ed.) 955-8;
and a very recent decision in Queen v. Brown and .fedley, L. R.
1 C. C. R. 70. The reason given is that unless the impeaching
witness is held to showing the extent to which an evil reputation
has affected a person's credit, the jury cannot accurately tell what
the witness means to express by stating that such reputation
is good or-bad, and can have no guide in weighing his testimony.
And since it is settled that they are not bound to disregard a
witness, entirely, even if he falsifies in some matters, it becomes
still more important to know the extent to which the opinion
in his neighborhood has touched him. It has been commonly
observed that to impeaching questions, witnesses, in spite of
caution, base their answers on bad character generally, which
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may or may not be such as to impair confidence in testimony.
When the question of credit under oath is distinctly presented, the
answers will be more cautious. The English rule was never very
seriously questioned until Mr. Grenleaf's statement in his work on
evidence, that the American authorities disfavored it: 1 Greenl.
Ev., see. 461. Of the cases he there refers to, not one contains
a decision on the question, and only one contains more than a
passing dictum not in any way called for: Phillips v. Kingfield,
1 Appleton 375. The authorities referred to in that case contained
no such decision, and the court declared the question not presented
by the record for decision. Phillips's and Starkie's American
editors allude to no such conflict. Webber v. Hanke, 4 Mich.
198, does not properly dispose of the matter. The objection alleged to such an answer by a witness is that it enables him to
substitute his own opinion for that of the jury, but this is fallacious.
The jury cannot understand the matter if they do not know the
ground for the witness's opinion. It is the same sort of difficulty
which arises in regard to insanity, disposition, temper, distances,
velocities, &c., where a witness is only required to show his means
of information, and then state his conclusion or belief based on
those means. If six witnesses are merely allowed to state that
one's reputation is bad, and as many say it is good, without being
questioned farther, the jury cannot be said to know much about it,
nor would any cross-examination be worth much,. unless it aided
them in finding out just how far each witness regarded it as tainted.
So fir as the reports show, the American decisions are decidedly
in favor of the English doctrine, and we have not found any considerable conflict: People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229; People v.
Rector, 19 Wend. 569; People v. Davis, 21 Wend. 309; Titus
v. Ash, 4 Foster 319; Boyle's Exrs. v. Kreitzer, 46 Penn. St.
465; I yman v. Philadelphia,56 Penn. St. 488; Knight v. House,
29 Md. 194 ; Stevens v. Irwin, 12 Cal. 306 ; People v. Tyler, 35
Cal. 553; .Easonv. Chapman, 21 I1. 35; Wilson v. State, 3
Wis. 798; Stokes v. State, 18 Ga. 17; Taylor v. Smith, 16 Ga.
7; Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 92; tecutcheon v. MeCutcheon, 9 Port. (Ala.) 50; Mokley v. lamit, 1 A. K. Marsh.
(Ky.) 590; United States v. Van Sickle, 2 McLean 219. Mr.
Greenleaf himself intimates that it might be a proper inquiry on
cross-examination. We think the inquiry proper when properly
confined and guarded, and not left to depend on any basis but the
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reputation for truth and veracity. And we also think that the
cross-examination on impeaching or sustaining testimony should be
allowed to be full and searching. Where an impeached witness
has changed his domicil his reputation in both places may be
shown within a reasonable limit of time. But, as the only object
is to know whether he is to be believed at the timewhen he testifies,
a witness knowing his reputation then should state that knowledge,
although he may also be authorized in addition to show what his
reputation had been elsewhere before.
The court should not have allowed the jury to consider any
counts except those that charged all the defendants, or any except
those that related to the burning with intent to defraud the insurers. No others specified any offence of which all could possibly
have been guilty, and upon the rest there should have been a discontinuance or acquittal.
Fuller's testimony as an accomplice was properly left to the
jury to believe or not, whether standing alone or corroborated. It
was proper for them to consider all the circumstances of his employment and conduct as affecting his credit, but they could not
be directed what force toL give these matters. While a jury cannot
be compelled to discredit all the testimony of a witness who has
,wilfully falsified, yet they may do so if they do not trust it. They
should not have been instructed that there was any condition on
which they were forbidden to reject his testimony, if they do not
believe it.
The court below refused to give the following instruction:
"This is a criminal trial on an information for felony, and all the
questions of law and fact in the case are exclusively for the jury,
and the jury are paramount judges both of the law and the facts."
The court held that they were judges of the law and fact under
some conditions and restrictions, but not in the absolute way indicated. The precise definition of a jury's rights in criminal cases
is easier understood than expressed. Their decision upon a
prisoner's guilt or innocence can never be directly reviewed, anil
upon an acquittal there can be no new trial. But if they have
the legal authority claimed in the request their verdict of guilty
would be of the same force as their acquittal. Exceptions have
usually been allowed in this country to the court's rulings on the
trial, and if erroneous the conviction will be set aside, because the
jury is expected to follow the charges given, and it is as contrary

HAMILTON v. THE PEOPLE.

69"

to law to refuse a proper charge as to give an improper one. The
law does not favor unnecessary intrusions by one functionary upon
the ground of others. But the judge's charge in criminal cases is
one of the traditionary incidents of a trial, and the great body of
authority holds it is meant to be for the guidance and instruction
of the jury and entitled to their respect. It is true that in criminal cases juri.s cannot find a conviction against their consciences,
and cannot be questioned upon their verdict. At common law a
conviction was as final as an acquittal, and could only be relieved
by a pardon. This immunity from censure or review is necessary
to liberty. In dealing with crimes a jury cannot be compelled to
separate the facts from the law. The right to give a general verdici
is essential to the integrity of the system, and experience haa
shown that special verdicts have not been favorable to justice.
But though it is within the power of juries to act upon their own
views of the law, it does not follow that the law does not assume
that they will respect the court's instructions.
The power of juries in civil and criminal cases is the same in
kind though different in degree. The practice of disregarding orrelieving against wrong verdicts is largely of modern growth..
Though they may be set aside, they cannot be reviewed or altered..
And setting them aside as against law is a matter of discretion and:
not of right. An appellate court can only review the action of'
the judge, not that of the jury, and this, too, not by virtue of the.
old law, but by force of statutes, which, though ancient, are yetlater in origin than jury trials. The jury system is generally regarded as deriving one of its chief advantages from having thelaw applied to the facts by the persons having no permanent offices.
as magistrates, and who are not likely to get into the habit of disregarding any circumstances of fact or of forcing cases into rigid:
forms and arbitrary classes. It is especially important where guilb.
depends on a wrong intent, to give full weight to every circumstance that can possibly affect it, and professional persons are constantly tempted to make the law symmetrical by disregarding:
small things. But it is necessary for public and private safety
that the law shall be known and certain, and shall not depend on.
each jury that tries a cause. And the interpretation of the law,
can have no permanency or uniformity, and cannot become generally known except through the action of courts. It may befairly regarded as one of the best features of the jury system-thtr
VOL. XXII--45
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the law, though interpreted by professional interpreters, can only
be applied to facts through the understanding of ordinary men of
average capacity, and usually including in this nxmber some of
very simple minds. By this process it is divested of all that would
not be readily comprehended by all men. In this way over-nicety
and technicality become less dangerous, if not absolutely harmless, and an apparent deviation in the verdict from-the rules laid
down is often no departure from the rules as supposed to be laid
down.
But if the court is to have no voice in laying down these rules,
there can be no security whatever either that the innocent may
not be condemned, or that society will have any defence against
the guilty. A jury'may disregard a statute as freely as any other
rule, and a fair trial in time of excitement would be almost impossible. All the mischief of ex post facto laws would be done by
tribunals and authorities wholly irresponsible, and there would be
no method of enforcing with effect many of our most important
constitutional and legal safeguards against injustice. Parties
charged with crime need the protection of the law against unjust
convictions quite as often as the public need it against groundless'
acquittals. Neither can be safe without having the rules of law
defined and preserved, and beyond the mere discretion of any one.
We must construe the jury system, like all other parts of our legal
fabric, in the light of history and usage. It came into this country
as a part of the common law, and it has been fixed by our constitutions as a known and regular common-law institution. Like many
of our best heritages from that source, we know what it is better
than how it was devised, or (which is more probable) came into use
without devising. We must look to the use as evidence of the law,
and looking to that we find that the judge has always assumed to give
the jury instructions upon the law. While there have been severe
complaints and stern measures to secure them from his control on
the facts, there has never been any attempt to abolish the practice of
charging on the law. All the improvements in mitigation of the old
system have gone upon the ground that the jury were expected to
follow the instructions of the court. The introduction of reserved
eases and criminal exceptions would be little short of an absurdity on.
any other theory. If there were any ground of complaint it would
not be for wrong instructions, but for giving any charge at all.
It is hard to deal with arguments which assume to qualify a system,
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and yet are not consistent with its uniform history. A jury system without a presiding judge who is something more than a puppet,
is not the jury system which we have inherited. If the charge is
proper it can only be so because it is to be respected. If juries
disregard it they may be free from personal risks, and in cases of
acquittal their verdict is conclusive. But the power to do wrong
with impunity does not make wrong right. The uniform practice
.and the decided weight of opinion is to require that the judge give
his views of the law to the jury as authority and not as a matter
to be submitted to their review. And while we recognise the
power of the jury to give wrong verdicts or disregard the law,
usage and authority warrant us in holding that such conduct would
be an abuse of their discretion, which could only be palliated by
such tyrannical and perverse instructions as their good sense should
teach them could not possibly be true or just. Thislquestion was
presented many years ago to the Supreme Court of this state, but
their decision, if made, was not reported and is not found: People
r. Supple, January Term 1853.
There is undoubtedly some difference between civil and criminal
cases in regard to legal presumptions which will prevent a judge
from instructing a jury in the same way as to their weight: Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212. It is well remarked that "1artificial
presumptions can never be safelfr established as means of proof in
a criminal case. To convict an innocent man is an act of positive
injustice, which, according to one of the best and most humane
principles of our law, cannot be expiated by the conviction of an
hundred criminals who might otherwise have escaped: 2 Hale
289. For such presumptions the common law is most abhorrent,
and happily our statute-book has not been disgraced by many violatio.ns of the common law in this respect :" Starkie Ev. 743, note
f., ed. of 1869. There is no conclusion or presumption of fact
which is not entirely within the disposal of the jury, and it is also
entirely for them to determine what portion of testimony to believe
or disbelieve; and "it is the conscience of the jury that must pronounce the person guilty or not guilty :" 2 Hale 313.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted.

MORROW v. WOOD.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
ANNIE MORROW,

RESPONDENT, V.

JAMES WOOD, APPELLANT.

A parent in sending his child to school surrenders to the teacher such control
over the child as is necessary for the proper government and discipline of the
school. But where the parent desires that the child shall omit a part of the regular
course of study and so directs him, the teacher has no paramount authority to

enforce the study of the omitted part, and corporal punishment of the child for
disobedience under such circumstances is an unlawful assault.
The fact that the school was a public one, in which the studies were prescribed
by statute, held not to vary the general rule as to the right of a parent to direet
the omission of part of the prescribed studies.
THis was an action by Annie Morrow, the respondent in error,
against Wood, the appellant, for malicious prosecution. The
plaintiff was a teacher in a public school, and the defendant, Wood,
was the father of one of the pupils, a boy about twelve years of
age. Defendant's child on coming to the school was directed by
plaintiff to take up certain studies including geography. The boy,
by command of his father, refused to study geography, and for
this disobedience was punished by the teacher. The father thereupon commenced a prosecution against the teacher for assault and
battery. After some continuances the proseclutor failed to appear
before the justice and the case was discontinued. The teacher
then brought this action and obtained a verdict for 5000, wheroupon the defendant took a writ of error to this court.
Barber , Clementson, for appellant.
G. C. Hazelton and 0. B. Thomas, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
is claimed by the counsel for the defendant that the
COLE, J.-It
court below should have granted the motion for a nonsuit, because
all the evidence showed that the criminal prosecution against the
plaintiff for an alleged assault and battery committed by her upon
the infant soTi of the defendant was never tried upon the merits,
but was discontinued on her motion and against the consent of the
complainant in that action. It is insisted that before an action
for malicious prosecution can be maintained it must appear thatthe criminal prosecution has been determined in favor of the party
prosecuted, by a trial and acquittal, or the prosecution must have
been discontinued against his consent.
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We shall spend no time in the consideration of this point in the
case, for the reason that we are fully agreed upon a question of
law involved, which is fundamental and underlies the cause, and is
entirely decisive of every other question arising upon the record.
And as this is a question of some practical importance as affecting
the duties and powers of teachers in our public schools we deem
it best to decide it in the present case. The facts upon which this
question of law arises as established on the trial, are these in brief.
About the 18th of November 1872, the plaintiff, a qualified
teacher under a contract with the district school board, commenced
teachieg a district school in Grant county. The defendant, an inhabitant of the district, sent his son, a boy about twelve years of
age, to the school. The defendant wished his boy to study orthography, reading, writing, and also wished him to give particular

attention to the study of arithmetic, for very satisfactory reasons
which he gave on the trial. In addition to these studies the plaintiff at once required the child to also study geography, and took

pains to aid him in getting a book for that purpose. The father,
on being informed of this, told his boy not to study geography,
but to attend to his other studies, and the teacher was promptly
and fully advised of this wish of the parent, and also knew that
the boy had been forbidden by his parent from taking that study
at that time. But, claiming and insisting that she had the right to
direct and control the boy in respect to his studies even as against

his father's orders, she commanded him to take his geography and
get his lesson. And when the boy refused to obey her and did
do as he was directed by his father, she resorted to force to compel
obedience. All this occurred at the first week of school. The
defendant instituted a criminal action before a justice for this
assault and battery upon his son, which is the malicious prosecution
complained of. If the teacher had no right or authority-to chastise
the boy upon these facts for obeying his father, this action must
fail. And whether or not she had the power to correct him is the
question in the case, for it is not pretended that the boy was otherwise disobedient or was guilty of any misconduct, or violated any
rule or regulation adopted for the government of the school. The
Circuit Court, in considering the relative rights and duties of
parent and teacher, among other things told the jury that where a
parent sent his child to a district school he surrendered to the
teacher such authority over his child as is necessary to the proper
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government of the school, the classification and instruction of the
pupils including what studies each scholar shall pursue, theie
studies being such as are required by law or are allowed to be
taught in public schools. And the court added in this connection,
that a prudent teacher will always pay proper respect to the wishes
-of the parent in regard to what studies the child should take, but
where the difference of view was irreconcilable on the subject, the
views of the parent in that particular must yield to those of the
teacher, and that the parent by the very act of sending his child
to school impliedly undertakes to submit all questions in regard to
study to the judgment of the teacher. In our opinion there is a
great and fatal error in this part of the charge, particularly when
applied to the facts in this case, in asserting or assuming the law
to be that upon an irreconcilable difference of views between the
parent and teacher as to what studies the child shall pursue,
the authority of the teacher is paramount and controlling, and that
she had the right to enforce obedience to her commands by corporal punishment. We do not think she had any such right or
authority, and we can see no necessity for clothing the teacher with
any such arbitrary power. We do not really understand that there
is any recognised principle of law, nor do we think there is any
rule of morals or social usage, which gives the teacher an absolute
right to prescribe and dictate what studies a child shall pursue,
regardless of the wishes or views of the parent, and, as incident
to this, gives the right to enforce obedience even as against the
orders of the parent. From what source does the teacher derive
this authority? From what maxim or rule of the law of the land ?
Ordinarily it will be conceded the law gives' the parent the exclusive right to govern and control the conduct of his minor children, and he has the right to enforce obedience to his commands by
moderate and reasonable chastisement. And furthermore, itis one
of the earliest and most sacred duties taught the child to honor
and obey its parents. The situation of the child is truly lamentable if- the condition of the law is that he is liable to be punished
by the parents for disobeying his orders in regard to his studies,
and the teacher may lawfully chastise him for not disobeying his
parents in that particular. And yet this was the precise dilemma in
which the defendant's boy was placed by the asserted authority on"
the part of parent and teacher.
Now we can see no reason whatever for denying to the father
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the right to direct what studies included in the prescribed course
his child shall take. lie is as likely to know the health, temperament, aptitude and deficiencies of his child as the teacher, and how
long he can send him to school. All these matters ought to be
considered in determining the question what particular studies the
child should pursue at a given term. And where the parent's
wishes were reasonable, as they seem to have been in the present
case, and the teacher by regarding them could in no way have been
embarrassed, her conduct in not respecting the orders given the boy
was unjustifiable. If she had allowed the child to obey the commands of his father, it could not possibly have conflicted with the
efficiency or good order or well-being of the school. The parent
did not propose to interfere with the gradation or classification of
the school, or with any of its rules and regulations further than to
assert his right to direct what studies his boy should pursue that
winter. And it seems to us a most unreasonable claim on the
part of the teacher to say the parent has not that right, and further
to insist that she was justified in punishing the child for obeying
the orders of his father rather than her own. Whence, again we
inquire, did the teacher derive this exclusive and paramount authority over the child, and the right to direct his studies contrary
to the wish of his father ? It seems to us it is idle to say the
parent, by sending his child to school, impliedly clothes the teacher
with that power in a case where the parent ekpressly reserves the
right to himself, and refus.es to submit to the judgment of the
teacher the question as to what studies his boy should pursue. We
do not intend to lay down any rule which will interfere with any,
reasonable regulation adopted for the management and government
of the public schools, or which will operate against their efficiency
and usefulness. Certain studies are require to be taught in the
public schools by statute. The rights of one pupil must be so
exercised undoubtedly as not to prejudice the equal rights of others.
But the parent has the right to make a reasonable -election from
the prescriled studies for his child to pursue, and this cannot possibly conflict with the equal rights of other pupils. In the present
case the defendant did itot insist that his child should take any
study outside of the prescribed course. But, considering that the
study of geography was less necessary for his boy at that time
than some other branches, he desired him to devote all his time to
orthography, reading, writing and arithmetic. The father stated
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that he thought these studies were enough for the child to take,
and he said he was anxious the boy should obtain a good knowledge
of arithmetic in order that he might assist in keeping accounts.
lie wished to exercise some control over the education of his son ;
and it is impossible to say that the choice of studies which he made
was unreasonable or inconsistent with the welfare and best interest
of his offspring. And how it will result disastrously to the proper
discipline, efficiency and well-being of the common schools to concede this paramount right to the parent to make a reasonable choice
from the studies in the prescribed course which his child shall
pursue is a proposition we cannot understand. The counsel for
the plaintiff so insist in their argument, but, as we think, without
warrant for the position. It is unreasonable to suppose every
scholar who attends school, can or will study all the branches
taught in them. From the nature of the case some choice must be
made, and some discretion be exercised, as to the studies which the
different pupils shall pursue. The parent is quite as likely to
make a wise and judicious selection as the teacher. At all events,
in case of a difference of opinion between the parent and teacher
upon the subject, we see no reason for holding that the views of
the teacher must prevail, and that she has the right to compel
obedience to her orders by inflicting corporal punishment upon the
pupil. The statute gives the school board power to make all
needful rules and regulations for the organization, gradation and
government of the school, and power to suspend any pupil from
the privileges of the school for non-compliance with the rules established by them or by the teacher with their consent ; and it is
not proposed to throw any obstacle in the way of the performance
of these duties. But these powers and duties can be well fulfilled
-without denying to the parent all right to control the education
of his children.
These views are decisive of this case. Under the circumstances
the plaintiff had no right to punish the boy for obedience to the
commands of his father in respect to the study of geography. She
entirely exceeded any authority which the law gave her, and the
assault upon the child was unjustifiable.
For these reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.

MoFAXLAI!D v. GOODMAN.

United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Wisconmn.
HENRY J. McFARLAND v. CHARLES GOODMAN Er AL.
M. and wife conveyed their farm to their daughter. M. was subsequently adjudged a bankrupt and on a bill by his assignee the deed was declared fraudulent
and void as to creditors. M. and wife then claimed a part of the farm as their
homestead. The bankruptcy court, without deciding this claim, ordered the land
sold, subject to any legal claim of M., and a purchaser having bought accordingly,
brought ejectment for the part claimed and occupied by M. as a homestead. Held,
that the purchaser was not entitled to recover. The deed being set aside the title
reverted to M., and then passed to his assignee subject to the exemptions of the
Bankrupt Act, as if the deed had never been made.
The fact that M.'s deed to his daughter reserved the right to occupy the land
as a homestead during his life, held to strengthen the foregoing conclusion but not
to be necessary to it.
The voluntary joining of a wife in a deed which is afterwards set aside as fraudulent against creditors, does not prevent her, on such setting aside, from claiming
her dower or homestead in the land.

James Cr. Jenkins, for plaintiff.

Levi Hubbell and Wm. P. L4nde, for defendants.
HoPKINS, J.-This is an action of ejectment for the recovery
of forty acres of land, which is in. the possession of and claimed
by Gaius Munger and Celia his wife, as a homestead. The
validity of that claim is the principal question, and the result of
the case depends upon its determination.
Under the issue joined herein, it is necessary for the plaintiff to
establish his title and right to possession.
Ejectment is a possessory action to the extent, that the right
of possession, on the part of the plaintiff, to the premises at the commencement of the suit, is essential to a recovery. Title without
right of possession, is not enough. It is a maxim of universal
application in ejectment, that the plaintiff must succeed upon the
strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of his adversary's. So a plaintiff fails, unless he shows title in himself,
irrespective of the question of the validity of the defendant's title.
The solution of the principal question depends almost wholly
upon the effect of the deed of Gaius Munger and wife to Isadore
G. Munger, their daughter, bearing date on the 2d day of December 1869, which was subsequently set aside and vacated, in a
suit in equity, prosecuted by the assignee of Gains Munger in
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bankruptcy, against Isadore, the grantee, on the ground that it
was fraudulent as to creditors.
The plaintiff derives title to the land under a deed from the
assignee; so, if the bankrupt's homestead right was not cut off by
the deed, or if the right to assert it revived and reverted to him
and his wife, on setting aside their deed, then his claim of title
thereto must fail.
From the evidence, it appeared that the land in question had
been occupied by Gaius Munger and his wife, as a homestead, for
over thirty years; that connected with it, was about 400 acres
more, which had been used as a farm up to the 2d December 1869,
when they conveyed the whole to their daughter, Isadore G., as
above stated.
That the only money consideration was $100, but it was agreed
between them, that Gaius and his wife were to continue to occupy
the premises as a homestead, during their natural lives, and were
to be supported by Isadore, during their joint lives.
That soon after executing the deed, proceedings in bankruptcy
were instituted against Gaius Munger, which resulted in his -being
declared a bankrupt, and the appointment of an assignee of his
estate.
That the assignee soon after his appointment, filed a bill in the
District Court of this district against Isadore G. Munger, to set
the deed aside, as fraudulent and void as against the bankrupt's
-creditors, which resulted in a decree, bearing date on the 5th
February 1872, declaring said deed to be fraudulent and void as
to the creditors of said bankrupt and the complainant his assignee,
and setting aside and wholly vacating it, and declaring, that the
defendant Isadore, as against ;he complainant therein, acquired no
right or title to or interest in the premises, or any part thereof, by
virtue of such deed, and declaring that the premises were the property of the complainant as assignee in bankruptcy, and also decreeing that Isadore convey them to the assignee upon demand;
'but no conveyance had been made by her, -before the trial of this
suit.
There was no question made in that suit, upon the homestead
question, or right of Gaius Munger and his wife, nor was any
decision made upon that point therein.
That after the entry of said decree, an application was made
before the District Court, sitting in bankruptcy, by Gaius Munger,
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to have the homestead set off; but it does not appear that any
definite decision was ever made upon that application, except that
the assignee in obedience to the instruction of the court, sold the
real estate, subject to any legal claim of the said Gaius Mfunger
to a homestead therein; which sale the court confirmed.
The defendant, Gaius Munger, gave notice of his claim to this
property, at such sale, as his homestead; that after the said confirmation, the plaintiff with full knowledge of such claim of Gains,
took the assignee's deed of all the premises conveyed to Isadore,
which covered the premises involved in this suit.
The assignee's deed did not contain the reservation or exception,
as to Gaius Munger's homestead rights, but the counsel for the
plaintiff consented on the trial to treat it as containing such exception or reservation.
The plaintiff obtained possession of all except the part in controversy here-Gaius and Celia his wife claimed their homestead
exemptions under the state laws, and refused to surrender possession of that part.
By the state statute, there is exempted to a debtor, forty acres
of agricultural land, or a quarter of an acre lot, in a city or village, owned and occupied by such debtor, as a homestead.
The owner of such homestead cannot alien it without his wife
joins in the deed. The deed of the husband alone is void: BHartv.
Houle, 19 Wis. 472; 2 Allen (Mass.) 203. The land being separated
by a highway running through it, does not defeat the homestead
claim, provided it is all in one body: Bunkerv. Lock, 15 Wis. 685.
His right to it as a homestead, up to the time of the deed, is not
questioned. The possession after the deed, continued as before.
The agreement that he should so enjoy it, was faithfully kept.
That deed being set aside and vacated as to the assignee, the
question arises as to the extent of the assignee's interest. Had
the assignee any greater interest in the land, than he would have
had, if the deed had not been given ?
Section 14 of the Bankrupt Act invests an assignee with the
title "to all property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his
creditors." Property so conveyed is considered as still belonging
to the bankrupt, and passes the same as if the title had not been
changed.
The assignee takes such property under and by virtue of the
Bankrupt Act, not under or through the grantee; and if he takes
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title under the Bankrupt Act, why cannot the'bankrupt assert the
exemptions and rights secured to him by the, act? The 14th
section, after providing for an assignment of the property of the
bankrupt, declares, that there shall be excepted from the operation
of the act, such property as is exempt Ifrom execution sale "by
the laws of the state in which the bankrupt has his domicil," and,
"that such exceptions shall operate as a limitation upon the conveyance of the property to his assignee." It operates like a
general execution, in favor of all creditors, and takes all property
subject to levy, and only such as may be made available upon
judicial process, to the payment of debts of the bankrupt: In
re Deciert, ante 624.
These provisions and restrictions, it seems to me, apply to all
property that passes to the assignee under the act, including such
as has been transferred to defraud creditors, as well as that where
the title is ostensibly in the bankrupt. If so, he takes no greater
interest in the one case than in the other. The limitation applies
to all he acquires under the Bankrupt Act, and he cannot be heard
to deny the bankrupt's title to property, which he receives and
claims through and under the operation of the bankrupt law. He
cannot deny and affirm the bankrupts title, at the same time.
The real estate covered by the annulled deed, having been treated
as the bankrupt's property, I think it must be considered, as to
the plaintiff in this case, as- such, and subject to all the rights of
the bankrupt and his wife, reserved to them by the bankrupt law.
This construction gives effect to all the provisions and limitations
of section 14th, and secures to all parties their rights.
But, in view of the facts of this case, this construction is eminently just, for it was agreed that the grantors, who were old
and feeble, should, notwithstanding the deed, occupy this property
as their home and be supported there, by the grantee, during their
lives.
The deed, under such circumstances, did not extinguish their
homestead rights: Crouch v. Murphy, 24 Wis. 365. That agreement they. could enforce, as against their grantee, and a court
of equitywould set aside the deed in case of her refusal to perform it.

So that the equitable right of the bankrupt to this property as
a homestead, had not been unconditionally surrendered or placed
where he could not enforce it against his grantee, if the deed had
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not been annulled in the interest of the creditors. But I do not
wish to be understood as resting my decision alone on this ground.
I think the decedent's homestead rights sustainable, upon broader
and more comprehensive grounds. The deed being set aside and
the creditors restored to their rights, as they existed before the
deed, upon what principle should the bankrupt be denied his rights,
as they were before the deed ? In the case of a homestead, there
is a peculiar reason for the adoption of this rule. The homestead
is exempted for the benefit of the family of the debtor; he cannot
deprive them of it, without the signature of his wife. To transfer
it requires their joint deed. Her right in it, is not simply inchoate, like dower, but present, possessory and indefeasible by her
husband. Neither can convey it except by joining with the other
in the deed. A defective deed, or deed inoperative and void, as
to either, is in my opinion ineffectual and void as to both, and
does not convey any title.
It was said, that she voluntarily executed this deed with her
husband; that she probably knew of his unlawful purpose. Suppose that to be the case, I do not think it alters her rights. The
position of a wife is such, and the influence of the husband over
her, that she is not held answerable for his frauds.
Homestead laws are now favorably construed by courts, as in the
interest of the debtor's family. In support of this proposition, I
need only refer to the enlightened decisions of our own state Supreme Court.
That court has decided that a deed of the homestead cannot be
set aside as fraudulent, as to creditors; for the reason, that, as the
creditors had no right to have it applied in payment of their debts,
while in the possession of the debtor, they could not be defrauded
by its conveyance, and could not follow or reach it, in the hands
of the alleged fraudulent purchaser: Duesterv. Bill et al., 11 Wis.
114; Pike v. Miles, 23 Wis. 164.
If the assignee claimed under this deed, or could claim under
it, a different result would follow. But he does not: he acquired
the bankrupt's title by operation of law, in hostility to the deed.
He has no privity of estate or connection of any kind, with the
grantee. He cannot maintain it to be both good and bad. The
law allows no such paradox. Nor can he enforce the grantee's
rights if she has any, as was contended by'the plaintiff's counsel
on the trial. I am aware that the decisions of the courts are not
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entirely in accord, on this question; but the conclusion I have
reached is not without the support of many well considered opinions
of other courts, federal as well as state. A different rule might
apply to personal property, for the wife in this state has no interest in that, or right to prevent its disposition by the husband, so
that the same reason for her protection in the use of that, does
%notexist. But I do not determine whether that is so or not. This
action relates to the homestead exemption, and my decision is not
intended to go beyond that question.
Judge DILLON, in Coz v. Wilder et al, 7 B. R. 241, s. c. 2
Dillon 45, examined this question and the kindred one of dower,
and decided, that a deed, executed by husband and wife, to defraud
creditors, did not bar the wife's dower nor defeat her right to the
homestead under the laws of Missouri. The same doctrine substantially, is laid down in Woodworth v. Paige, 5 Ohio St. 70; Robinson v. Bates, 3 Allen (Mass.) 40; l7ogler v. 3fontgomer,
ante 244, and by Judge )TITHERS, in Be Pratt, Central Law
Journal, Vol. 1, p. 290. This brings me to the consideration
of the effect of the decree, in the suit of theassignee against Isadore
Munger.
If Gaius Munger and his wife had been, parties' to that suit, and
such a decree had been entered, they would have been concluded;
but not being parties, they are not affected by it. But if they had
been joined in'that suit, they could have set up their homestead
claim, and if they had,, according to decision in Druester v. Bill
et al., supra, the deed, as to the homestead portion, would not have
been declared void; the title to the homestead portion would have
been confirmed in their grantee, and as between her and the bankrupt and his wife, it was to continue to be their homestead (luring
their natural lives. They, in that case, would have had the full
benefit of their right, under the statute. But the assignee omitted
to make them parties and took a decree, annulling the deed, as to
the whole land embraced in the deer], without reservation.
The -decree doubtless estops Isadore and all persons claiming
under her, from ever setting up any title to any portion of the
premises, under that deed as against the complainant and those
claiming under him. It, as before said, not only declared the deed.
void and that she acquired no title under it, but it required her to
convey to the assignee all her right and title.. This clause, except
for some others, which most emphatically declare that she acquired
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no title, might be considered as conceding some title in her; but
I think such is not the fair construction. It was inserted for
greater caution, and only to quiet the title against the deed, and
nat meant that she was to transfer an independent substantial
title. Thus interpreted, it is consistent and not contradictory, and
d ,es not establish any title in the assignee under her, nor arty
privity between her and the assignee. In the case of Wins/ip v.
Lamberton, referred to by Judge THURMAN, in Woodworth v.
Paige, supra, the decree set aside the deed as fraudulent as to
creditors, and required the fraudulent grantor to convey to assignee
or receiver, like the one under consideration. The wife joined
with her husband in executing the fraudulent deed, in that case,
as in this: but the court held, that neither the deed nor decree
barred her dower; that the clause in the decree requiring a conveyance was not meant to pass an independent title, but simply to
quiet the title against the deed; and the widow was allowed her
dower, notwithstanding she had signed the deed, .the court holding
that the annulled deed could not be interposed to defeat her dower.
If such a deed and decree annulling it, does not defeat a widow's
right of dower, upon what ground can it be maintained that they
estop the widow from asserting her claim to the homestead? There
is nothing in the nature of the rights to cause any difference, and
I think if she is not estopped as to her dower-right, she is not as
to her homestead.
But there is another difficulty in the plaintiff's way, upon the
theory contended for, he is neither a party nor privy to this deed;
and the rule is well settled that a stranger cannot set up an estoppel, because there is no reciprocity. Estoppel only binds parties
and privies; so that, unless he devises title under the deed, he
cannot assert the rights of the grantee hnder it: 1 Wash. on Real
Property 234 ; Poxty v. Bennett, 11 Mass. 298 ; Sears v. Ranks.
11 Ohio St. 298. Again in Morton v. Noble, 57 Ill. 176, it is
said, "We fully recognise the doctrine, that when the deed from
the husband and wife becomes inoperative, as to the husband's
estate, because made in fraud of the rights of the creditors, or, by
reason of any wrongful act on the part of the husband, the wife is
.not barred by the deed," citing in support of that doctrine, 11 Ill.
384; 13 Id. 483; 16 Id. 122; and 23 Id. 634.
If this is the true doctrine as to the dower right, and there is no
distinction between dower and homestead rights, these authorities

